“China and East Asia: After the Wall Street Crisis,” begins on the premise that the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 was in principle an American financial crisis. The sub-prime mortgage debacle was actually of America’s own making. To a degree it impacted the rest of the world, including China. Beijing pumped in some 4 trillion renminbi to keep its economy afloat. Which it did. However, the rest of East Asia was not badly affected, due to trade and other commercial links with China that continued unabated.
The three editors Lam Peng Er, Qin Yaping and Mu Yang are impressive analysts in their own right. Qin and Lam in particular believe that the region should be based on an institutional architecture that reflects regional characteristics. If the Asian way or consensus is the prime mode of decision making for example, it does not make sense to introduce a decision making mechanism by majority or a system of decision making where all voices are equal, only to have the larger powers trying to veto the consensus of the smaller ones.
Of course, with consensus, one is actually aspiring for a high degree of unanimity. The institution(s), identity, and ideational factors all have to converge; precisely at a time when Asia remains a disparate entity. China, Japan and Korea, for example, have forged ahead. But ASEAN, despite its strong growth of 4.5 percent to 5 percent remains divided by a wide income chasm . The per capita income of Cambodia is USD 450 as opposed to USD 37,000 in Singapore. There is also no mechanism in ASEAN to assist one another; despite paying a fee of USD 1 million a year equally to enjoy the benefits of ASEAN.
This book is not a difficult read. It functions, not unlike a “thumbs up” or “thumbs down” signal, on the state of the region vis a vis China. On China and Malaysia, for example, the state of the relationship is described by Professor Lee Kam Hing as positive. Lam Peng Er himself averred that Asia needs to rediscover its roots. In 17th-18th century Hoi Ann in Vietnam was a bustling port that allowed all the Asian countries to trade together.
The problem with China is its dormant nationalism. As exhibited in the May 4th movement in 1919 or rock throwing incidents against the US embassy in 1998, Chinese citizens can suddenly display a strong dose of nationalism. More examples include when the US embassy in China was under attack by Chinese mobs when the US accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, causing numerous casualties.
“China and East Asia,” can indeed grow from strength to strength, as Qin Ya Ping pointed out. But the test of any relationship is the ability to overcome a conflict, even one as acute as South China Sea. Unless and until China and various claimants in South China Sea can attempt some forms of joint development, all bets on perpetual peace with China are off. This seems to be in concurrence with the view of numerous Asian leaders.