China isn’t necessarily a country, Lucian Pye at MIT once said, it is a “civilization pretending to be a state.” Like all civilizations, it must have had its fair share of violence; not unlike AmericaUnited Kingdomor for that matter, France. But M. Taylor Fravel, who is also at MIT, noticed something rather unique: Over the last century, despite a previous century of humiliation, where its territories were torn and taken, China has been adept at compromising in all 23 border and maritime conflicts.
Indeed, China has given up 2.6 million square miles in 17 land negotiations, in exchange of some 230,000 square miles, to preserve its border integrity and peace. These concessions were granted or given at a time when China was going through wild phases of nationalism and Cultural Revolution. Truly, the leaders in China, do know a thing or two about peace or the notionthat “strong borders make for a secure nation,” and potentially “better fences make even better neighbors.”
That China embraces the creed of non-intervention more deeply than other great powers suggests a diplomacy still deeply rooted in the classical tradition of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648; and not necessary the concepts of universal human rights that prevailed since 1948. Thus, one can see that China is weak on liberalism, though getting better each day, but very strong on conservative foreign policy framework.
The issue facing China is maritime borders. Does China have what it takes to be just as generous and thoughtful in areas like the South China Sea or East China Sea viz Japan, its modern nemesis? No one knows for certain since the increasing shrill and assertive tone of Chinese foreign policy behavior, some of which include batting more than an eyelid on the wayward behavior of the Chinese fishing vessels that often come to the very noses of the ASEAN neighbors. If China can rein in the People’s Liberation Navy (PLN), but not the Chinese fishermen, can China receive a big portion of the blame that it is still expansionist?
Neighbors like Indonesia are testing the limits of China’s strategic restraint. Illegal Chinese vessels caught poaching and fishing in Indonesian exclusive economic zones have had their ships towed to Indonesia, detained, subsequently blown up and sank to the bottom of the sea. Amidst it all, while China has protested, it has also protested through diplomatic channels, rather than through the loudspeaker of the people and the press.
China, when push comes to shove, can indeed understand the limits of others; that patience can run into a boil. But in M. Taylor Fravel’s book, one can also see that China takes breakaway “provinces” like Taiwan, even potentially Hong Kong one day, very seriously. More than 1000 missiles are aimed at Taiwan should it declare its independence from China.
One would also hope that China and India can resolve their conflicts over Aksai Chin near the Himalayas. But with China secure in its relationship with Pakistan, China does not necessarily see India, its massive neighbor, as a strategic ally, since India’s constant stress on democracy and freedom of speech, can be a tad overbearing on China. China is bent on the politics of development; not human rights or democratization per se. This book successfully explained China’s behavior on various territories, including Taiwan and Tibet and the native Turks in Xinjiang.