When two of the best minds on defense issues pair up to write a book on China and the United States, the policy makers should sit up and listen. Why? Michael E. O’ Hanlon and James Steinberg are not mere academics. They have worked with President Bill Clinton as well. Given their experience in the ”real world” they ought to know what would work, and what would fail.
On this count, they argue that there are now two camps in the Sino-Chinese school debates. In one corner, some believe that Sino-US relations will grow from complex interdependence, hence, conflicts between the two would be avoided and diffused. In the other corner, stand a group of hyper or structural realists, who argue that Sino-US tensions are inevitable, granted that both want to be top dogs in the region. Their mere aspiration would lock the two in a deadly spiral.
But this book, which is premised on “strategic reassurance,” is derived from the many cases and episodes where the US and Soviet Union were able to contain theirambitions and aggressions. They were not successful at every count, as when they got themselves involved in various proxy wars in Middle East, Latin America, and Asia, but at the very least, their arms reduction negotiation paved the way for the relationship to acquire some semblance of stability.
The authors argued that this model can work to the advantage of Sino-US relations in areas as diverse as cyber-security, nuclear arms, maritime security and arms modernization in space; even amphibious military capabilities. China, for one, has restrained itself in the latter, in order not to give the impression to the US that it is always at the ready to re-claim Taiwan by force. If China can exercise such self-restraint, the authors proceed to argue that there is hope for better and stronger Sino-US relations. The very fact that President Xi Jin Ping called for a “new great power relationship” in 2013 implies an acknowledgement of this logic of strategic reassurance.
Like all theories, evidence can be made to fit into them. This is one of those books, too. Just as the US-Soviet relationship could be stabilized through a process of mutual assurance and mutual verification of each other’s offensive abilities, coupled with the help of orbiting satellites that spy on each other, the chances of success in transforming the dynamics of the Sino-US relationship are anything from fair to equal. One would hope they are right. The South China Sea is now a simmering conflict between China and the US. But one might also be inclined to suspect that the foreign policy postures of both countries will ultimately come down to “local politics.” If there are sufficient constituencies to goad each other on to be more combative, why not? As President Xi Jin Ping cracks down on the corruption in China, he will be held captive by the need to be a hyper-nationalistic president, without which the popular support may wane; leading to a whiplash against his anti-corruption campaign. In China, any false move by a politician, no matter how powerful, can lead to the end of his life, and the life of his family members. It is that heartless. Michael E O’ Hanlon and James Steinberg are not oblivious to the cruelties of the domestic politics back home. After all, the Soviet Union used to be a cruel and crude behemoth.
One faux pas, and the leader is consigned to the dust heap of history; as had happened to Mikhail Gorbachev, a reformist communist. But, despite such insights, they still argue with force and eloquence that the Sino-US relationship can, and will improve, over time, if the two countries keep adopting a posture of mutual clarification, verification, and re-assurance.